The Government contends that the presence of treaty obligations in this case adds a distinctive compelling state interest not present in the normal Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") case. In making this argument, the government systematically misstates the implications of the treaty obligations in this case.

First, the government wrongly assumes that treaty obligations in the abstract automatically satisfy RFRA's requirement of demonstrating a compelling state interest furthered by the least restrictive means. Rather, RFRA requires individualized scrutiny of all federal laws, including treaties. Second, while the government is correct in asserting that statutes should be construed where possible to avoid inconsistency with treaty obligations, the fundamental point is that a later-adopted statute such as RFRA prevails where the intent to override is clear and where inconsistency remains.

Third, there are a number of reasons for thinking the treaty obligations in this case do not necessarily preclude granting an exemption for religious use of hoasca. The 1971 Convention itself gives some latitude to implement a treaty with due regard for a country's "constitutional, legal and administrative systems." Moreover, some selective enforcement is inevitable and could be reasonably extended to cover the hoasca situation.

Fourth, in the present case, the supposed treaty obligations being asserted by the government, when properly interpreted, don't even apply. Finally, the obligation to defer to the political branches in foreign policy matters does not imply that the judiciary must abdicate oversight of domains clearly entrusted to it by Congress through RFRA.

For all of these reasons, the government's attempt to invoke treaty obligations to cover its failure to comply with RFRA's demands is unavailing.